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ABSTRACT
This paper is about the dilemma raised against musical ontology by Roger 
Scruton, in his The Aesthetics of Music: either musical ontology is about 
certain mind-independent “things” (sound structures) and so music is left 
out of the picture, or it is about an “intentional object” and so its puzzles 
are susceptible of an arbitrary answer. I argue the dilemma is merely 
apparent and deny that musical works can be identified with sound 
structures, whether or not conceived as abstract entities. The general 
idea is this: both Platonism and nominalism about musical works are a 
kind of fetishism: musical works are not “things”, in Danto’s sense of 
“mere real things”; they rather involve complex relationships between 
objects, events, and different kinds of functional properties. For this, I 
draw on Levinson and Howell’s notion of indication, combined with 
Searle’s approach to institutional reality... with a little twist of my own.
Introduction
A spectre haunts the ontology of music – the spectre of abstract sound structures, 
conceived of roughly as a sort of Platonic universal: entities tokened by material 
objects while lacking spatial existence themselves, existing eternally (for they en-
ter not causal relations nor have spatial parts), as well as temporally and modal-
ly inflexible. Such entities are appealed to in order to explain the phenomenon of 
musical works’ repeatability: spatiotemporally distinct sound events counting as 
occurrences of the same work W, in virtue of a connection with an abstract entity, 
connection which is not causal, but rather described in terms of instantiation – the 
same relation that would hold between all physical inscriptions of the word “vocif-
erant” and the word itself, considered as a Platonic type (so that five inscriptions of 
the word “vociferant” count as five token-words, but there is only one type-word 
involved). The main difference between types, under this notion, and properties 
in a realist ontology about universals is that the former are subjects of predication, 
individuals, not being themselves predicated of other things, unlike properties 
(we apply to musical works the property referred to by the predicates “strident” 
or “delicate”, but we don’t predicate, in turn, the musical work of something else).
A good deal of musical ontology consists of a clash of intuitions for and against 
the identification of musical works with entities similar to Platonic universals (the 
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most popular among them being the theory of musical works as norm types, pro-
posed by Julian Dodd (Dodd 2007: 32)), following other contemporary musical Pla-
tonists such as Peter Kivy and Nicholas Wolterstorff); or with some sort of concrete 
entity: from classes and mereological fusions to “homeostatic property clusters” 
(Magnus 2013: 109) – a particular version of the theory of “historical individuals” 
(Rohrbaugh 2003) – among several other theories. Other proposals in theoretical 
space consist in identifying musical works with action kinds (Currie 1989), which 
are abstracta but contrast with musical Platonism’s types, which are types of sound 
event; and also with token actions (Davies 2004). There are also theories identi-
fying musical works with abstract entities but defending that these are sui generis, 
capable of being created and destroyed (Thomasson 1999), unlike more traditional 
views on abstract entities. The situation in musical ontology has been described by 
some writers, such as Thomasson or Kania, as “an embarrassment of riches” (Ka-
nia 2008: 20) of theoretical proposals.
I don’t wish (nor would that be feasible) to make an exhaustive inventory of 
extant theories and their several versions, together with arguments against those 
theories, followed by the defence of an additional proposal. The difficulties raised 
by each theory have been widely explored in the literature. What I shall do is more 
akin to arguing for a framework, desirably plausible and productive, to conceive 
the ontological status of musical works in what they have peculiarly, as products 
of intentional human activity, that is, to conceive their status qua musical works 
and qua musical works. For what concerns us, I shall consider three kinds of on-
tological theory about musical works, without focusing on the specificities of any 
example of this or that kind in particular: 1) theories which identify musical works 
with sound structures, conceived of as Platonic entities, 2) theories which identi-
fy musical works with sound structures, conceived of nominalistically, and 3) the-
ories like Jerrold Levinson’s, which identify musical works with indicated types, 
or sound-structures-S-indicated-by-composer-C-in-historico-musical-context-M 
(Levinson 1980; 2011; 2013). Although Levinson himself views a sound structure S, 
partly constitutive of a musical work, as an abstract entity, we can easily imagine 
a version of that theory in which all statements about S are given nominalist para-
phrases, while the rest of the theory remains the same. The idea is to suggest that 
to identify musical works with previously given “things” in the world, independent 
of intentional states, coordinated beliefs and systems of representations, whether 
those “things” are concrete or abstract, is a form of fetishism1 that has skewed the 
ontological debate on musical works (and other “culturally emergent” or “socially 
constructed” items [Margolis 1974]), specifying a necessary though not sufficient 
element for the world to include such entities.
I dislike the idea of abstract entities. To say of two concrete things that they 
“instantiate” the same universal seems to me the same as a prolonged noise which, 
in the end, merely expresses the following: “There is this ubiquitous phenomenon 
we refer to as the ‘sharing of properties’: the world seems to contain repeatable 
things, the language we use to describe it seems to denote repeatable entities, and 
1  I use the term “fetishism” as a deferential allusion to John Dilworth’s paper “How to 
Reform Danto’s Vehicle Fetishism”, although I give it a slightly different purpose and don’t 
follow Dilworth in viewing all artworks as abstract (in his own peculiar manner).
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we don’t know how that works nor how to describe it without raising a host of dif-
ficulties.” Two things, x and y, share clusters of properties, and in virtue of that they 
count as two things of the same type. There is a sense in which those properties 
that x and y possess are unique things, distinct from one another, as everything in 
space and time, and a sense in which they are the same thing, despite their being 
spatiotemporally discontinuous. We can hardly make sense of the world without 
appealing to this repeatability in our discourse. But to describe that phenomenon 
in terms of a non-causal relation of “instantiation” of abstract entities by concrete 
ones seems to add absolutely nothing of true explanatory value, besides giving so-
phisticated names to what we ignore.
However, my aim here is not to argue against any realist or Platonic ontology, 
nor to argue for a nominalist one. In fact, I think it is not at that “fundamental” lev-
el of our ontology that our characterization of things like musical works is played 
out. Conceiving ontology as a “layer cake”, in which at the most fundamental layer 
we deal with the “brute facts” about the world, for instance, the option of dividing 
the world between concrete particulars and universals, and at the upper layers deal 
with more complex entities, we also see that entities such as artworks or musical 
works will not figure in that more fundamental layer, independently from complex 
connections with intentional states, functional properties imposed on objects and 
events, contextual settings, systems of representations allowing this whole appa-
ratus to work, and so on. At the end of the journey, I hope at least to have given a 
clear image, if not of the way to characterize musical works ontologically, then of 
how they shouldn’t be so characterized.
A Scrutonian Dilemma for Musical Ontology
In The Aesthetics of Music, Roger Scruton asserts, about the ontological puzzles 
raised by musical works, that these concern either the metaphysical status of an 
“intentional object”, in which case they are susceptible of an arbitrary solution, or 
they concern the sounds in which the musical work is heard and are nothing but 
a special case of problems about the nature and identity of events (Scruton 1997: 
108). (That is, nothing special would be added by the fact that these are musical 
entities, as well as artworks.)
My proposal may be understood as a way of accepting the first horn of this 
apparent dilemma – questions of musical ontology are not about an object exist-
ing independently of the intentional states of beings like us – rejecting the conse-
quence that any ontological description we may adopt of such entities is arbitrary 
or that they are all equivalent.2 What happens is that most ontological descriptions 
of musical works (those that fall under 1 and 2 above) share the problem I charac-
terized as a form of fetishism inhering in the expectation of identifying musical 
works with “things” we can place in a description of reality as it is, independently 
of us; “things” that one or other philosopher, according to his/her sensibility, tends 
to identify with either concrete or abstract objects.
2  The idea that ontological theories of music are equivalent, because equally adjusted to 
the empirical facts, and we may adopt any one of them without affecting what really mat-
ters to us in music was defended by James O. Young (Young 2011; 2014).
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Platonic shadows and their material doubles
That great ideas always start with basic everyday matters may be illustrated (some-
what imaginatively) by the fact that Socrates’ father, Sophroniscus, was a sculptor. 
How tempting to imagine little Socrates in his father’s workshop, observing a fig-
ure slowly gaining shape in the stone, at each strike of the chisel. Suddenly, one 
blow doesn’t come out as intended and, with subsequent touches, the final shape 
will have to be adjusted, adapted, so as the intervention of the unexpected doesn’t 
result in an obvious imperfection. Hence, an idea (not an Idea) begins to dawn on 
little Socrates’ mind: the material world forever aspiring to reach the condition of 
the ideal Form, while always falling short of it; things we can see and hear as shad-
ows of the genuinely real objects, impassive dwellers of a world where no skewed 
blow of a chisel can affect them, forever indifferent to the transformative intru-
sion of causation. There they lie (whatever sense one can make of “there” in this 
context), awaiting discovery by inquisitive minds, sufficiently discerning to catch 
a glimpse of them.
Still under the analogy with sculpture, we find an echo of such idea in a remark 
by Samuel Alexander about a famous set of unfinished statues by Michelangelo:
In Michelangelo’s unfinished statues of slaves in the Academy at Florence we can 
feel the artist not so much making the figure as chipping off flakes of the marble 
from the figure which is concealed in it, and which he is laying bare (vivos ducunt 
de marmore voltus). (Alexander 1988: 73)
This idea is all the more intriguing in virtue of being about that which is, to-
gether with painting, one of the paradigmatic singular artforms (those in which 
works have only one token: the original). In this sense, hewn sculpture and paint-
ing are traditionally contrasted with music and other multiple artforms (those in 
which works can have an endless multiplicity of tokens), to the extent that in them 
the artwork is intuitively identified with a physical object. However, observations 
such as the preceding suggest that, with an effort of the imagination, all artforms 
can be conceived as multiple. If the artist discovers the figure hidden in the stone, 
and we identify the sculptural work with such a figure, then we must conclude that 
the work precedes the creative action of the artist, who, strictly speaking, doesn’t 
create something that wasn’t already there. Besides, nothing ties the figure hid-
den in the stone essentially to that stone in particular – it can be equally “hidden” 
in another stone. Only our conventions make it the case that hewn sculpture and 
painting are singular artforms, that is, our practice of privileging the first token of 
the figure as the original. We don’t do this with music, though we could imagine 
alternative scenarios where we would.
The idea that artists discover forms in the physical material rather than create 
something new finds vigorous expression in the musical Platonism defended by 
philosophers such as Kivy and Dodd. Like in Alexander’s imaginative exercise about 
Michelangelo’s unfinished statues, musical Platonists hold that composers discov-
er “sound structures” in the logical space of tonal combinations. They see musical 
composition as a process of eliminating candidates, analogously to the idea of the 
sculptor removing fragments of stone with his chisel, to reveal the figure hidden in 
the stone. Hence, the “sculpture” was not introduced in the world, but was already 
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there, merely concealed by the material that prevented the apprehension, through 
the senses, of the true object of appreciation and aesthetic enjoyment.
However interesting this imaginative exercise, it flies in the face of one of our 
most deeply rooted intuitions about artworks, not just in sculpture and painting, 
but also, and especially, in the case of musical works: that these are essentially cre-
ations of their artists. Something new is introduced in the world, over and above 
the concrete instantiation of a possible structure or pattern. In particular, philos-
ophers hostile to Platonism insist that the same structure, realized in different cir-
cumstances or contexts, acquires different aesthetic and artistically relevant prop-
erties, and that such difference determines a difference in identity, which would 
prevent a work from being identical with any structure whose instantiation may 
be involved in its production. When we appreciate a work, we don’t appreciate it 
merely as a realization of a possible structure, thought we certainly could, some-
what like we appreciate the beauty of stalactites and other geological formations. 
The fact that we don’t is one of the persistent facts about our relationship with art. 
In particular, we appreciate works for what they reveal about its production, the 
achievement it represents. This idea was expressed with remarkable clarity and 
power of synthesis by Gregory Currie:
An interest in the aesthetics of artifacts is, for those cases where the distinction is a 
real one, an interest in something that unites both factors [activity and product]: an 
interest in the product-as-outcome-of-activity. That is why the aesthetic appreci-
ation of nature as genuinely natural is so different from the aesthetic appreciation 
of art. (Currie 2009: 18)
Here is one of the marked differences between appreciating natural forms and 
appreciating art: artefacts, but not natural structures, have styles, something they 
can only have through their connection with human minds and specific historical 
circumstances. The same object, against the background of different styles, ex-
hibits different properties. An example of this, used by Robert Howell, is that of 
a musical work composed by Erik Satie, exhibiting the same “sound structure” of 
Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony: such a work would be
an uncharacteristic, parodic freak, not the Fifth Symphony once over again, a work 
displaying the dramatic progression of Sturm, Drang, and ultimate resolution that 
is present in that symphony. (Howell 2002: 106)
Though this example appeals to something incredibly unlikely, there is nothing 
metaphysically impossible about it, not to mention there are in the actual world ex-
amples of things sufficiently suggestive of the same (e.g. when a composer adopts a 
“conservative” neoclassical style after a sequence of bold and revolutionary works).
To be traced back to artistic intentions, susceptible of being recognized in the 
object, rooted in different and varying contexts of production, alters the essential 
properties of the object which is the artwork, even if it doesn’t alter a mere possi-
ble structure embodied in it, so that the same structure can be embodied in objects 
that differ essentially, to the extent that there are essential properties those objects 
have, properties that depend on something beyond mere structure.
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Consider the following verbal sequence in James Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake:
Vociferagitant. Viceversounding. Namely, Abdul Abulbul Amir or Ivan Slavansky 
Slavar. In alldconfusalem. As to whom the major guiltfeather pertained it was Her-
cushiccups’ care to educe. (Joyce 2012: 355)
In a possible world where there wasn’t an individual named Percy French (1854-
1920), who, in 1877, wrote a parodic song about the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-
1878, titled “Abdul Abulbul Amir”, this verbal sequence imagined by Joyce could 
not contain an allusion to the song, mentioning the names of the two characters 
who, in the story there narrated, fight each other in mortal combat, ending in mu-
tual destruction. Reading the first two words of the sequence, the line “the din it 
was heard from afar” in French’s song would not resound in the reader’s mind. But 
allusions in a work are an essential property of it, as essential as the very word se-
quence. So, a work must always be more than any structure it exemplifies.
Now, if any property is essential to an artwork, it is a fair supposition that artis-
tically relevant properties are. These include semantic or representational proper-
ties, which may bear on a work’s aesthetic character, which shouldn’t happen were 
we to consider it as but the instantiation of a pattern. Structurally similar or even 
qualitatively identical stylistic features, in different artistic traditions, can have pro-
foundly different functions and meanings, as is the case with golden backgrounds 
in a Byzantine mosaic and in a Japanese rinpa painting. A “structure” formed by 
the sum of features such as these will always vary in artistic properties, depending 
on the context and artistic categories (Walton 1970) to which the work belongs.
The notion that different works can share the same structure was notorious-
ly explored by Borges in his short story “Pierre Menard, author of the Quixote” 
(Borges 1999: 88–95) and applied to the philosophy of art by Arthur Danto, who 
converted the thought experiment in a peculiar method of analysis by indiscern-
ible replicas, with a view to demonstrate precisely this idea. And the idea is nicely 
captured in Currie’s words: the artist’s activity brings something new to the world, 
not reduceable to the structure that the material object, the work’s vehicle (that is, 
the bearer of aesthetic, semantic, and other properties) instantiates, whether this 
object is a marble sculpture, the inscription of a literary text or the performance 
of a musical work.
The idea I am reaching for, and that I shall defend in the following sections, 
is that artworks (and musical works qua artworks) are complex functional enti-
ties, whose ontology is neither adequately captured by straightforward Platonism 
nor nominalism. Structures or patterns, whether conceived as Platonic entities or 
through the most ingenious nominalist paraphrases, perform but a limited role in 
the fact that the world contains artworks. While being a part of what is indispens-
able for the presence of artworks in the world, they are not the whole story, and 
surely not identical with the works themselves. The works are more than the sum 
of all the things indispensable to their presence in the world. Using here for my 
own purposes the words of Chris Small,
Music is not a thing at all but an activity, something that people do. The apparent 
thing “music” is a figment, an abstraction of the action, whose reality vanishes as 
soon as we examine it at all closely. This habit of thinking in abstractions, of taking 
from an action what appears to be its essence and of giving that essence a name, is 
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probably as old as language; it is useful in the conceptualizing of our world but it 
has its dangers. It is very easy to come to think of the abstraction as more real than 
the reality it represents. (Small 1998: 2)
“Music is not a thing at all”, in the specific sense that it is neither identifiable 
with a material object nor with an “abstract object”, such as a sound structure or pat-
tern. In “fundamental” ontology we look for “things” – either concrete or abstract – 
and we try to place in that “conceptual map” those entities we wish to identify, e.g. 
events, actions, persons, properties, and whatever else to which we systematically 
refer in our discourse about the world. We want to “carve the world at its joints”, 
to know its structure, as it is independently of what we think, but there are things 
in our discourse and our experience of reality that don’t fit this image, because, in 
part, they depend on relations between a diversity of elements and also our coor-
dinated beliefs. The relation between all those things produces something that is 
more than the sum of the related parts, so that we cannot place them adequately 
in a conceptual map that merely describes the world in terms of “things” and brute 
facts. What we need is an understanding of the continuity between the level of things 
and brute facts and those more complex emergent entities, such as artworks are.
Properties, Patterns and Types
One of the distinctions that seem to me most important in musical (and art) ontology 
was introduced by Robert Howell (2002). It is the distinction between properties, 
patterns and types. In his paper, Howell undertakes a defence of the Levinsonian 
idea of “indicated types”: temporally initiated entities (by contrast with Platonic 
types), that result from an act of indication, by a composer, in a specific musico-his-
torical context, of a sound structure that, in virtue of that contextualized act of in-
dication, acquires properties that no Platonic type can possess. The view against 
he is arguing is that of Julian Dodd, who identifies musical works with norm types, 
conceived as Platonic entities, corresponding to what for Jerrold Levinson is but 
an ingredient of musical works – the so-called sound structures (which Levinson 
also conceives as abstract entities). There is a technical difference between Dodd’s 
types and sound structures, in the sense that, for Dodd, types have no structure, 
given that they have no spatial parts, but this detail can be ignored: Dodd can ac-
cept to describe his norm types as “sound structures”, as long as we tacitly apply 
the idea of “analogical predication” he takes from Wolterstorff: when we say that 
the sound structure contains a B flat in the fourth measure, we are not saying that 
the type contains measures or notes sequentially, in the same sense that its tokens 
have them, but something like the type being such that all its well-formed tokens 
contain those things in the prescribed order.
Howell’s attack on Dodd proceeds in two fronts. On the one hand, he argues 
that not all properties are eternal. He does this by appealing to the notion of im-
pure properties, that is, properties that “essentially involve” contingent entities, 
such as the property being a son of Lincoln or being an Elizabethan playwright. The 
idea is that those properties only start to exist when the entities they essentially in-
volve themselves start to exist. So, if a type essentially involves an impure property, 
this type cannot exist eternally. On the other hand, Howell invokes a distinction 
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between patterns and types, aimed at blocking Dodd’s argument, even if we con-
ceive all properties as eternally existing. The idea is that the mere possibility of 
a pattern specified by certain properties doesn’t suffice for us to conclude that a 
given type exists. For natural kinds, it is required that the patterns have a place in 
“actual causal chains” (Howell 2002: 117), and for cultural kinds, such as works of 
music, it is required that the patterns are actually used by a community, in a certain 
way (Idem: 110). Only as part of an actual practice of a community of agents with 
coordinated beliefs about the use of patterns can the latter underlie the existence 
of types which are actually present in the world.
In this conception, cultural types such as Finnegans Wake and the words of which 
it is made, the musical work Fantasia on a Theme by Thomas Tallis by Vaughan 
Williams, the sea shanty Haul on the Bowline, the Game of Tabla (tavla or back-
gammon3), the painting Mud Bath by David Bomberg, among countless other ex-
amples of such things, are not Platonic entities, whether or not our basic ontology 
includes abstracta of some sort, such as properties and patterns.
To clarify this idea, we can make use of an example Howell himself doesn’t em-
ploy. This is an example reminiscent of Danto’s method of “indiscernible replicas” 
to show that artworks are not to be confused with the “mere real things” that serve 
them as vehicles, as in the thought experiment opening The Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace, where eight perceptually indiscernible red canvases are placed side 
by side, which canvases not only include distinct works of art but also objects that 
are not artworks (Danto 1980: 1–2). The purpose is to show that specifying a pat-
tern is not sufficient to determine certain types, even if it is for some of these (e.g. 
having four right angles is sufficient to determine Square Thing).
Consider the word sequence CANE NERO MAGNA BELLA PERSICA. Read 
in Latin, that sequence means “Sing, Oh Nero, the great Persian wars”; read in Ro-
manesco dialect it means “The black dog eats a fine peach”.4 Now, here we have 
two sentences and only one underlying perceivable “pattern”, and the difference 
between both – what individuates them as sentences – resides not in the underly-
ing pattern but in the connection between the pattern and the coordinated beliefs 
of humans using the pattern. The pattern itself is insufficient to determine any of 
the sentences. In fact, the very same pattern, if produced in a way that is wholly 
non-intentional, by natural erosion on a rocky surface, or by a row of ants, would 
not constitute a sentence at all. Only against a background of systems of represen-
tations, sustained by coordinated beliefs, could any pattern determine a sentence. 
Besides words, Howell gives the example of the graphic pattern of the swastika, 
common to a pre-Colombian symbol for, among other things, fire, and the Nazi 
party symbol. And from here we can extrapolate to countless other examples.
To mention just another example, given by Joseph Margolis, in a paper defend-
ing precisely that the relation between a work and its “occurrences” or “tokens” is 
not the relation of instantiation but the relation of “embodiment”:
3 Tavla is the Turkish name for the same game denoted by the Slavic word “tabla” and 
the English “backgammon”.
4  Another known exemple of such na ambiguous word-sequence is “I VITELI DEI RO-
MANI SONO BELLI” – Latin: “Go, Vitellius, the gods of Rome call to arms”; Italian dia-
lect: “The calves of the Romans are beautiful”.
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Looking at an array of great stones I can speak of and attribute properties to the 
Japanese stone garden embodied in it only by reference to a suitable cultural tradi-
tion; but the garden will be identified by identifying the set of stones in which it is 
embodied. The reason, once again, we don’t confuse the two is because (since they 
are different) not all the properties attributed to the one can be truly attributed to 
the other and because (since art is culturally emergent) not all the kinds of properties 
attributed to the one can be coherently attributed to the other. (Margolis 1974: 191)
The type Japanese Stone Garden is not an abstract structure instantiated by 
spatial configurations of rocks, but a more complex entity, which finds a place in 
the world only when configurations of this sort find a place in relations between 
humans in an appropriate context, that is, when socially coordinated agents attri-
bute to a configuration X certain functions Y in an appropriate context C.5 What 
results from this connection between the elements X, Y and C is more than each 
of those things taken by themselves, or conceived in abstraction from actual so-
cial practice. It is that relation between the different elements (not the relation of 
instantiation between a Platonic universal and its tokens) that operates the transi-
tion from the mere pattern (element X) to the type.
The connection between the pattern and the type, that is, the relation in vir-
tue of which coordinated agents can use patterns to generate types, would be the 
same to which Levinson refers with the term “indication”, in a wider sense than the 
mere “pointing towards”: in specifying a sound pattern on a score, or presenting 
a paradigm performance of it, a composer indicates a musical work, thus creating 
a new type. “Indication” refers an intentional action, which in turn presupposes a 
background of coordinated beliefs, making it intelligible. That is, in indicating a 
sound pattern, the composer is not merely selecting acoustic properties in isola-
tion, but also applying the conventions in use within the artworld. The previous 
paragraph seeks, so to speak, to provide a glimpse into the structure of that rela-
tion of indication, which, in Levinson, is perhaps still excessively linked to the in-
dividual intentions of an agent.
There is a structural resemblance between these cases and other cases of in-
stitutional entities, e.g., the fact that this metal disc in my pocket, with a certain 
graphic pattern stamped on its surface, is a coin or currency. It is an objective fact 
that this disc of metal in my pocket is a coin, but what makes it so doesn’t reside 
simply on the metal or the stamped pattern. It is required a system of coordinated 
beliefs so that any object in the world, including stamped discs of metal, count as 
money or can perform the function of being a means of exchange. The fact that I 
have a stamped disc of metal in my pocket is a brute fact; the fact that I have cur-
rency in my pocket is not only a social fact but also an institutional one. Coins are 
more complex objects than stamped discs of metal. We can employ here the idea 
of “levels of description”, corresponding to layers in our ontological “layer cake”, 
such that there is a layer where we can have stamped discs of metal but not coins, 
these being possible only when we introduce agents and coordinated beliefs, as it 
happens with Danto’s indiscernible replicas: the “mere real thing” that constitutes 
5  “X counts as Y in C” is the formula used by John Searle (Searle 1995; 2010) to represent 
the structure of institutional facts. In the final section I explore the application of his ideas 
to the subject of art a bit further.
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the “vehicle” of the artwork is not sufficient to determine the fact that there is an 
artwork. It is also required that which Danto calls an “interpretation” and an “at-
mosphere of theory” (Danto 1964: 580), in the absence of which nothing can be 
conceived as art and, therefore, nothing can function as art, for the functional prop-
erties of something depend on the connection to intentional states of humans and 
a specific context of cooperation between them.
Dodd’s Argument in Favour of Platonic Types  
and a Howellian Answer
To conclude this limited exploration of one aspect of the recent literature in musical 
ontology, I reproduce Dodd’s argument, in a brief rendition of it by Andrew Kania 
(Kania 2008: 23), for the idea that all types are eternally existing Platonic entities:
(1) The identity of any type K is determined by the condition a token
meets, or would have to meet, in order to be a token of that type.
(2) The condition a token meets, or would have to meet, in order to be a
token of K is K’s property-associate: being a k
So (3) The identity of K is determined by the identity of being a k.
So (4) K exists if and only if being a k exists.
(5) Being a k is an eternal existent.
So (6) K is an eternal existent too.6
As is evident from what has been said above, Howell counters Dodd’s argument 
by attacking premises 4 and 5. What he says about “impure properties” is aimed 
at refuting 5, and his distinction between properties, patterns and types is intend-
ed to undermine 4.
An “impure” property is a property that “essentially involves” (in Howell’s phrase) 
one or more contingent particulars, such as being a son of Lincoln or being an Eliz-
abethan playwright. The idea is that such properties cannot exist while the contin-
gent items they essentially involve do not themselves exist exist.
Dodd’s answer to this kind of argument is that properties such as being a son 
of Lincoln must exist before the entities they supposedly “involve” do (Dodd ac-
cuses Howell of obscurity as to the notion of a property “involving” contingent 
particulars) for instance, in 1066 it was true that no one alive was a son of Lincoln, 
although that truth was not epistemically available to anyone at that time. Now, 
that truth, according to Dodd, presupposes the existence of the property. Thus, 
for Dodd, even “impure” properties are eternally existing and the presence of any 
such properties in the world determines the existence of any types of which they 
are the “associated properties”, regardless of what beings such as us think or do. 
Consequently, even if a musical work is an “indicated type”, involving a reference 
to contingent particulars, Dodd believes that it raises no obstacle to the existence 
of the type, previously to the existence of the particulars it involves.
Premise 4 is a biconditional asserting that if a type exists, then the associated 
property also exists, and if the associated property exists, then the type also exists. 
Howell’s distinction is intended to neutralize the biconditional by falsifying the 
6  See Dodd 2007, especially sections 3.3 and 3.4, where Howell’s paper is discussed.
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second conditional comprised by it. The idea is that although the existence of the 
type entails the existence of the properties by which we identify it (the associated 
property, which can be a complex property or conjunction of simpler properties), the 
reverse is not true: the mere fact that certain properties occur in the world doesn’t 
determine, by itself, the existence of types. What Howell does is to interpose, be-
tween properties and types, a third item: patterns. Any combination of properties 
determines a pattern (e.g. the property of having alternate bright and clear squares 
determines the pattern of the checkered board – common) but this is insufficient, 
according to Howell, to determine a a type (e.g. Chessboard), or at least to deter-
mine cultural types, “indicated and intiated”, that is, essentially tied to coordinat-
ed intentional states of humans (though not all initiated types are indicated types).
Thus, a cultural type such as the game of tabla involves patterns: the graphic 
display of the board, the patterns formed by all possible moves, etc. But the mere 
presence of those patterns in the logical space of possibilities doesn’t determine 
the actual existence of a type (namely, Tabla), even one lacking instantiations. This 
type only figures as an item in the world when all those patterns I mentioned stand 
in a certain relation with coordinated beliefs of humans. In other words, the exis-
tence of the type presupposes some “thing” (the patterns) and a relation of indica-
tion, that consists of its actual use by a community, in a certain way. This exam-
ple allows me to bring into evidence an aspect of indication which is not usually 
addressed: when Levinson first proposed his theory of indicated types (Levinson 
1980), he made explicit his intention to account for musical works in a certain pe-
riod of music’s history, leaving open the possibility of the theory not being appli-
cable across the board. This was related especially with the essential connection, 
proposed by Levinson, between musical works and their composers. But maybe 
not all musical entities, for any time or musico-historical context, are essentially 
connected to an individual composer, assuming any are. Now, some cultural types 
such as the Game of Tabla are not at all bound to an individual “creator”. Even if 
the origin of the game was attributable to a specific individual, that would not be 
part of the identity of the game, and, nonetheless, the type Tabla, like all games, is 
an indicated type. This raises questions about indication being variable for differ-
ent kinds of indicated types – what is the criterion? The answer to this implies a 
more thorough approach to the notion of indication than the terms in which Levin-
son has expounded the concept, namely, in terms of an individual making his (or 
her) own a certain pattern.
Elsewhere I defended that a fruitful path to explore would involve combining 
the notion of indication, such as we find it in Levinson-Howell, with John Sear-
le’s approach to the structure of institutional facts. If we observe carefully, each of 
the elements entering the game of tabla has an institutional status. A tabla piece 
is not simply a slice of wood. It is not enough to have a certain shape to be a tab-
la piece. What is required here is something similar to what makes the event of a 
ball hitting a net count as a goal in soccer. The purely physical event of a ball hit-
ting a net is insufficient to make it the case that the world contains things such as 
goals, though there is no separate physical event here. We need a shared system 
of representations for the world to include something as palpable and objective 
as a goal in a soccer match. The same is true of what counts as a piece, a point, a 
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board or a legal move in tabla. Each of these, and many more, is an institutional 
fact: perfectly objective and dependent on human belief. In the absence of such 
connection, none of the patterns associated with any game determines the game 
itself, just as no graphic or acoustic pattern is sufficient for something to count as 
a sentence in a language.
Dodd’s reply to the distinction drawn by Howell resembles his answer to contex-
tualist arguments based on thought experiments of distinct works that are also musi-
cal doppelgänger, that is, works that share the same sound structure though differing 
in aesthetic and artistic properties. Dodd argues that such properties, supposedly 
of the work (like virtuosity, originality, etc.), are in fact properties of the composer’s 
action, not of the work. (Though plausible for some situations, this kind of answer 
is unsatisfactory, as is clear in the case of allusions, for instance.) In answering the 
idea that types only exist when patterns acquire the essential property of actually 
being used, Dodd asserts that it is not the type itself that must have that property, 
but rather its tokens, so as being able to count as tokens of the type. So, the reply is 
that Howell incurs in a type-token confusion, just as contextualists in general would 
be confusing properties of the work with properties of the compositional action. 
For instance, to the argument that the graphic/phonetic pattern “glank” doesn’t 
correspond now to a (type)word actually existing in English, though contingently 
non-instantiated, that it rather doesn’t exist at all as a type, Dodd answers that not 
being a word in English doesn’t entail that the (Platonic) type is non-existent, but 
only that no token satisfies the conditions set by the type (to be used as a noun, in 
order to refer such and such, being spelled and uttered in this or that way, etc.), so 
one could say that the (type)word has entered a language (e.g. English). Dodd ap-
peals to the idea that one and the same word may enter more than one language 
(as is the case with Schadenfreude or chic, for instance, which are used in English, 
though originating elsewhere) and that the implausibility of attributing (type) words 
to particular languages illustrates what is wrong in Howell’s argument. In producing 
tokens of the type, the speakers of one or several languages make it the case that 
the (type) word enters that language, but they don’t cause the type to exist, which 
type, as a Platonic entity, exists eternally. For Dodd, examples such as that of the 
word sequences ambiguous between different sentences (in Latin and Romanesco 
dialect), or the geometric patterns shared by distinct symbols (the pre-Colombian 
symbol and the Nazi swastika), are correctly described in the following manner: 
the (eternal) property being-a-graphic/phonetic-sequence-ф-used-to-signify-P7is 
the associated property of a (Platonic) type, which it determines, and the (eternal) 
property being-a-graphic/phonetic-sequence-ф-used-to-signify-Q is the associated 
property of another (Platonic) type, which it determines.
How plausible is this answer? To me it is as plausible as asserting that “glank” 
has a place in a private language before it is part of any known natural language. 
To say that a word exists, with “incorporated” meanings, in the form of conditions 
that any token must satisfy to be an occurrence of that word is to lose sight of the 
fact that actual use by a community is constitutive of what a word is. It is a sort of 
regression to an Augustinianism about how words mean – the idea that words al-
ready have meaning, that is, that they are words, outside of “language games” in 
7  Substitute inscription-ф for graphic/phonetic-sequence-ф wherever necessary.
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which they take place, as if previously given “things” then inserted into the game, 
rather than “equilibrium points in coordinated action” (Zangwill 2014: 144) – ex-
cept that in the type-token view we are placing them in a sort of Platonic purgato-
ry, rather than in the private mental world of a speaker.8
The Platonist may be suspicious of such an answer. And the reason why he will 
be suspicious of it, I suspect, lies in conceiving the possibility of “glank” being a 
word in one or more natural languages in terms of the eternal existence of the “as-
sociated property” of the type GLANK (qua word), in the same way that he con-
ceives the truth, in 1066, that no human being alive is a son of Lincoln, in terms of 
the truthmaker of that thought entailing the existence of the property being a son 
of Lincoln. But this seems to ignore that the truthmaker for any proposition deny-
ing the existence of instances of types whose “associated property” is an incoher-
ent cluster of properties (that is, a type that has no possible instantiations) cannot 
plausibly depend on that associated property actually existing, for the property is 
incoherent. However, the negative existential is true.
Likewise, the proposition “No human being is a son of Lincoln” is true, though 
epistemically inaccessible, in 1066, because no human being alive at that time was 
in a (causal) relation of descendancy with the individual born in 1809 in Hodgen-
ville, Kentucky, USA, assassinated in 1865 in Washington D.C., who was the 16th 
president of that country, and not because the “Platonic purgatory” contains the 
eternal property being a son of Lincoln, which no human being instantiates in 1066. 
Here the Platonist will doubtlessly feel tempted to reply: “Yeah… Relation… Univer-
sals!”, although the point, as Howell has remarked, is whether the impure property 
being a son of Lincoln is a Platonic type, and not whether the filial relationship is 
conceived as a universal. Dodd (Dodd 2007: 74) protests that to conceive the first 
as a non-Platonic impure property amounts to “ontologize” the complexity of the 
relation involved (which includes a contingent particular), but this doesn’t seem, at 
the outset, a sin greater than the ontologization he himself incurs, when he thinks 
of truth conditions for propositions: Dodd infers that the property has to exist, 
because there is in 1066 a condition something must satisfy in order to be a son of 
Lincoln, but here he incurs in an implausible “ontologization” of what the truth 
conditions a proposition must satisfy for it to be true are, turning those conditions 
into properties in a “Platonic purgatory” (hovering over the material world, but al-
ways under the promise of not remaining forever there, uninstantiated).
The Twofold Functional Character of Musical Works (qua Artworks)
In the beginning of this paper I said I was not going to argue for a particular onto-
logical theory, but for a possible framework, desirably both plausible and fruitful, to 
conceive the ontological status of musical works qua musical works and qua musi-
cal works. The shifting emphasis allowed us to catch a glimpse of how to eliminate 
the seeming redundancy, but now I would like to finish with a few words on this 
distinction between a work qua musical entity and a musical entity qua work. To 
8  See the comments by Jim Stone (Stone 1994: 439– 440), in a paper that addresses the 
nature of games.
ON MUSIC: CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES │ 49
do it will allow me to throw a little more light on what I have characterized as the 
complexity of acts of indication, without which no type genuinely emerges from 
a pattern or combination of patterns available in “logical space”. What I shall do 
here is to sum up a few conclusions I have reached elsewhere, thinking about the 
nature of music and the contrast between functionalist and proceduralist theories 
about the nature of art. Such an exploration is out of the scope of the present pa-
per, in virtue of which this will assume a somewhat dogmatic character. Its func-
tion here is merely to give the reader a notion of how vast the territory that the 
ontological contextualist about musical works sets out to map, equipped with the 
concept of “indication”, is.
The musical Platonist, as we have seen, treats the concept of “work” as if the 
“metaphysical baggage” that concept carries were minimal: repeatability and audi-
bility. This approach to the concept of work pushes the Platonist towards sonicism 
about the individuation of works (the thesis that musical works are individuated 
by acoustic properties only), and occupying that position concerning the individ-
uation question makes either Platonism or its nominalist “double” inescapable: 
once established the equivalence between “work” and any sonic repeatable, we are 
left with the task of isolating the “thing” in the world, with which we will identi-
fy it – the “sound structure” – the genuine target of our propositions about works.
In the view I adopt, however, the concept of “work” carries a somewhat heavier 
metaphysical baggage. And the distance between it and a mere sonic repeatable is 
the Howellian distance between a mere pattern and a genuine type. Nonetheless, 
that distance too is sensitive to contextual variations, in a way that no specific in-
dividuation theory can guarantee its application across the board, to all musical 
works in art history. What does this mean?
The distance between a pure sound pattern and a genuinely musical entity lies 
in the functional character of what it is for something to be music. Nothing is music 
only in virtue of mind-independent acoustic properties. Birdsong seems like singing 
to us because it reminds us of our singing, though in itself it is as musical as a bark 
or meow. And if a bizarre atmospheric phenomenon was to produce a sequence of 
pitched sounds, indiscernible to our ears from a Balkan melody, say, as played by a 
shepherd with the frula (a kind of flute, traditional of Serbia), it would not actually 
be music in virtue of it, just as if, by a miraculous chance event, erosion on a rocky 
surface were to produce a pattern indiscernible, to our eyes, from a series of deco-
rative motifs, that reason alone would not suffice to make it the case that the pat-
tern was indeed a certain example of decorative art. Only things that would bear the 
same functions as that specific decorative pattern, or maintain the same appropriate 
causal-historical links with those patterns, could count as such. Nature has no styles. 
The difference between two indiscernible instantiations of a pattern, such that one 
embodies a style and the other doesn’t, is a difference in functional properties. The 
decorative pattern, to start with, has the function of exhibiting its continuity with 
other patterns that count as tokens of the type, and of generating a certain kind of 
experience, intelligible only when one has the type has a background, as well as 
other stylistic properties of which it is distinct. We don’t appreciate it merely as a 
bearer of certain aesthetic qualities, in the way we appreciate natural formations. 
We appreciate it as a convergence point of “historical-artistic” intentions, or as 
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something that is deliberately envisaged for a mode of attention entirely distinct 
from that which is appropriate to rocky formations produced by erosion.
There are two elements here we should distinguish: appreciation of the pattern 
as an intentional vehicle of aesthetic qualities, and appreciation of the pattern as 
representative of the particular style at issue. There is a core of formal properties 
(dynamics, balance, elegance, etc.) whose presence doesn’t crucially depend on 
conventions about such properties. Someone who completely ignored the style 
could experience the congruence, dynamism, balance, elegance, etc., of the pat-
tern. But nothing counts as a representative, say, of a decorative Iznik pattern in-
dependently of conventions about the style itself, in the same way that nothing 
counts as a representative of the Persian musical style radif or, while we’re at it, as 
a representative of a symphonic movement in sonata-form, independently of there 
being conventions about how to count such things. The distinction I am drawing 
is, thus, the distinction between things that count as representatives of a type T in 
virtue of conventions, and things that count as representatives of a type S in vir-
tue of something they do, independently of conventions. Searle has signalled this 
distinction between types of functional properties with the terms “causal-agentive 
function” and “status-function”. Our ability to impose functions of the second kind 
on objects is what makes institutional facts and entities possible. We have seen 
above, concerning the example of the Japanese stone garden, the basic structure 
that coordinated beliefs must have for there to be functions of the second kind: “X 
counts as Y in C”, in which X stands for “things”, events or even persons, Y stands 
for a function or functions the thing will perform in virtue of collective recogni-
tion, and C stands for the appropriate context in which all of this can really work. 
Two relevant properties of this structure are indefinite vertical iteration and indef-
inite horizontal interlocking. What are these properties? The former means that 
any Y element in such a structure can become the X element of a further structure 
(that is, to be a thing with a certain status-function can be a part of the conditions 
something must satisfy to be a candidate for attribution of a further Y function); 
the latter tells us there is an “horizontal” combination of an indefinite number of 
these structures, such that anything with a certain status-function makes part of 
the context C of another structure, or other applications of the same structure, so 
as to generate further status-functions. For instance, a certain wooden object, with 
a certain shape, counts as a tabla piece in an appropriate context, and a certain 
configuration of pieces counts as the closing of a point in tabla (a point cannot be 
closed by using anything that is not a tabla piece). Part of the context in this ex-
ample of vertical iteration is the point itself, which only counts as such in the ap-
propriate context (the graphic pattern on the board is not sufficient, since a board 
with more or less than six points per quadrant would not count as a tabla board).
The structure for the attribution of causal-agentive functions differs from this 
one: an agent or agents have an intuition that certain functional properties F will 
be sustained by certain physical properties P (e.g. a certain acoustic configuration 
will be listened to as a sequence of tones, with a certain set of aesthetic qualities) 
and the agent or agents produce objects or events bearing in mind the realization 
of these functions. The fact that the object or event performs such functions will 
not depend on a convention about what such function itself is.
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Returning to the idea of the distinction between a work qua musical entity and 
a musical entity qua work, this involves the distinction between two types: Musical 
Entity and Musical Work. The distinction is then explained in terms of functions: 
to be music simpliciter, a sound event must have certain causal-agentive functions; 
to be a musical work, that sound event must also be a bearer of status-functions. 
Something can be music in the absence of conventions for musical works – in an 
alternative scenario where all musical performances are spontaneous improvisa-
tions, never to be repeated, there are no “works” in the sense in which we use that 
concept – but nothing counts as a musical work in the absence of conventions for 
musical works. As in the case of tabla, the presence of a mere repeatable pattern is 
not sufficient: it is required that such pattern figures as an element in a structure 
of coordinated beliefs.
To conclude this digression in dogmatic register, the functions one attributes to 
a musical entity qua work can vary in thickness, that is, according to the context, 
functions performed by musical works may include or exclude essential reference 
to a specific composer or a set of specific performance means. As such, no indi-
viduation theory, such as sonicism or instrumentalism, will apply across the board 
to the whole of music history, but will depend on conventions which vary accord-
ing to context. In some cases, musical works may be more like the type Tabla, and 
in other cases they can be more like the paradigmatic works of Sturm und Drang 
romanticism. Thus, how fine-grained the individuation of a musical work must be 
will depend on conventions (which is different from them being simply arbitrary) 
and not on inherent properties of “sound structures”, independent of the way we 
conceptualize works.
The difficulty faced by most theories in the literature, giving them the air of ar-
bitrariness pointed out by Scruton, lies in the attempt to treat musical works some-
what like we treat natural kinds, ignoring the metaphysical baggage of the concept 
“work” and reducing it to the notion of a mere sonic repeatable. Sonic repeatables 
are, in fact, independent of us and our beliefs, but the ontological level (or level of 
description) at which they exist, whether as concreta or abstracta, is not the level 
at which we can find artworks or musical works qua art.
Conclusion
The seeming dilemma Scruton raises against musical ontology is but an appear-
ance of such. If we accept that metaphysical questions about music concern not 
its mere “acoustic vehicle” (the sonic repeatables in which musical works are “em-
bodied”) we are not, in virtue of that fact, confined to a range of merely arbitrary 
solutions for metaphysical puzzles. Some answers are more illuminating or explan-
atorily powerful than others, even though we cannot guarantee their truth in every 
detail – they point us toward paths that are more or less fruitful. Specifically, the-
ories that avoid the “fetishism” of the sound structure, conceiving works as com-
plex functional entities, as emergent wholes that are more than the sum of parts 
standing in the relations that sustain them (a pattern of tones, the agents who “in-
dicate” it, the shared beliefs that make it possible to speak of musical styles, forms 
and traditions, etc.) in a way that much resembles how certain institutional entities 
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“emerge” from a configuration of elements which are not susceptible, taken each 
in itself, of being identified with the entity at issue.
The reader can now imagine a club of tabla aficionados (who are also perhaps 
addicted to philosophical puzzles) this entity, “the club”, is not to be identified with 
any particular building that may host its head office, with a specific set of mem-
bers and officials, nor with official documents establishing its “legal personality”, 
though each of those things “embodies” the entity at issue, in the way a score, a 
performance, ideas in the minds of agents, etc., embody a musical work. Nor is the 
club a Platonic type, that would actually exist previously to the coordinated, caus-
ally interconnected actions and beliefs that constitute the “life path” of the club in 
the concrete world. The club exists when those actions and beliefs exist, and not 
simply because the existence of such entity or of those actions and beliefs is an 
open possibility in the world. Something new is introduced in the world when hu-
mans create things such as clubs of tabla aficionados addicted to philosophical puz-
zles, just as something new is introduced in the world when there is coordination 
of beliefs about what counts as a piece, point, quadrant, board and legal moves in 
tabla. Neither tabla, nor Vaughan William’s Fantasia, nor Joyce’s Finnegans Wake, 
nor Bomberg’s Mud Bath existed before the actions that caused those entities to 
emerge from merely possible patterns took place.
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Vitor Gererju
Da li su muzička dela zvučne strukture?
Apstrakt
Ovaj rad posvećen je dilemi u vezi sa ontologijom muzike, koju je u svom delu The Aesthetics 
of Music izneo Rodžer Skruton: ili se ontologija muzike bavi određenim „stvarima” nezavisnim 
od uma (zvučne strukture), u kom slučaju je sama muzika isključena, ili se ona bavi „intenci-
onalnim objektom”, te su stoga njeni problemi podložni arbitrarnim rešenjima. Naš je stav da 
je u pitanju prividna dilema, te da se muzička dela ne mogu izjednačiti sa zvučnim struktu-
rama, bilo da ih razumemo kao apstraktne entitete ili ne. Načelno, ideja je sledeća: i plato-
nizam i nominalizam u pogledu muzičkih dela su vrste fetišizma – muzička dela nisu „stvari” 
u Dantoovom smislu „pukih realnih stvari”. Naprotiv, ona podrazumevaju kompleksne veze 
između objekata, događaja i različitih vrsta funkcionalnih svojstava. U tom pogledu, oslanjam 
se na Levinsonov i Hauvelov pojam indikacije, kao i na Serlov pristup institucionalnoj realno-
sti... uz mali zaokret sa moje strane.
Ključne reči: ontologija muzike, platonizam, nominalizam, umetnička dela, tipovi.
